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Treatment of Emission Reduction Credits in
Bankruptcy
Tilda Chot
In recent years, 'pollution credit' trading has generated
much controversy. At first glance, it may seem that these pro-
grams demonstrate that the government condones or even en-
courages pollution. In reality, this type of trading allows Con-
gress and government agencies to promulgate rules that will
decrease overall pollution emissions at a lower cost than with
more traditional reduction programs.2
Because trading in pollution credits is a new concept, legal
commentators and the courts have not yet addressed its relation-
ship to other areas of the law. To that end, this Comment ad-
dresses the relationship between pollution trading programs and
bankruptcy law. Legal commentators and the judiciary have
heretofore ignored the imminent problem of the bankrupt debtor
holding pollution credits.
The treatment of pollution credits in the context of a bank-
ruptcy proceeding affects the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), Congress, creditors, the judiciary, and utility company
participants. The EPA and Congress have an interest in the
treatment of pollution credits in bankruptcy because it may bear
on the regulatory effectiveness of the trading programs. Creditors
require accurate information about the assets of a company in
order to assess its creditworthiness. Judges need to know how to
treat and value emissions credits in bankruptcy proceedings
before them. Finally, utilities need to better understand the
ramifications of their behavior in using, selling, and buying these
credits. This Comment suggests an approach to the treatment of
these credits in bankruptcy.
t B.S. 1992, University of California at Berkeley; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of
Chicago.
Pollution credit trading entails an initial allocation of credits, which correspond to
a particular level of pollution, and allows entities to pollute more or less than allocated,
buying or selling excess credits. See discussion at Parts L.A and I.B.
2 Major Vincent Joseph Rafferty, Jr., Uncle Sam Goes to Market: Federal Agency
Disposal of Emissions Reduction Credits under the Federal Property Management Regula-
tions, 146 Milit L Rev 154, 167-68 (1994).
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Part L.A discusses Congress's first attempt at emissions
trading legislation. Part I.B describes the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments that created the federal sulfur dioxide ("SO2") trad-
ing program to lower the incidence of acid rain. Part II.A ex-
plains the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that determine the
inclusion or exclusion of the debtor's assets in the bankruptcy
estate and the impact that insolvency has on the trustee's pow-
ers. Part II.B shows that no courts or commentators to date ap-
pear to have addressed the treatment of pollution credits in the
bankruptcy context. Part III.A argues that the bankruptcy estate
should include the debtor's unused emission reduction credits.
Finally, Part III.B analyzes the different methodologies available
to value these credits and concludes that fair market value is
most consistent with the Bankruptcy Code.
I. EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAMS
The treatment of excess credits created by pollution trading
programs in the bankruptcy context is an unresolved question.
The Clean Air Act ("CAA")' and the Bankruptcy Code ("Code")4
are the primary statutes that must be considered in formulating
an approach to the treatment of emissions credits in bankruptcy.
Congress passed its first air pollution law in 1955,' followed by a
long series of amendments, the most recent coming in 1990.6 The
CAA establishes national air quality standards to be implement-
ed in large part by the states.7 Further, it charges the EPA with
implementing the CAA's provisions.8 The Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides a mechanism by which debtors can discharge past liabilities
and "obtain a financial fresh start."9 It exhibits a balance be-
42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994).
11 USC § 101 et seq (1994).
Act of July 14, 1955, 69 Stat 322, codified as amended at 42 USC § 7401 et seq
(Chapter created was subsequently named the Clean Air Act. Act of Dec 17, 1963, Pub L
No 88-206, 77 Stat 392, 401.).
' The most notable amendments include: Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub L
No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub L No 95-95, 91 Stat
685; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399.
42 USC § 7407-10. See also John Quarles and William H. Lewis, Jr., The New
Clean Air Act: A Guide to the Clean Air Program as Amended in 1990 7-16 (Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius, 1990) ("New Clean Air Act").
42 USC § 7601.
Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Cases, Problems, and Materials on
Bankruptcy 37 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1990).
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tween the interests of the debtor, its creditors, and the- general
public.10
A. Congress and the EPA's Initial Emissions Trading Programs
Since the mid-seventies, policy makers have attempted to
introduce a measure of flexibility into the CAA's regulatory
framework.11 At the EPA, this movement culminated in 1986
with an emissions trading policy allowing for various forms of
intra- and inter-firm trading.2 In 1990, Congress continued the
shift toward more flexible strategies by initiating a national sul-
fur dioxide ("SO2") trading program for electric utilities, thereby
creating an open market for tradeable pollution allowances. 3
These two programs demonstrated Congress's switch from
traditional 'command and control' tactics to market-based incen-
tives to induce companies to improve air quality. The former
approach set mandatory limits on pollution emissions or required
specific technologies for the control of particular pollutants. 4 In
stark contrast, the more recent programs provide polluters with
economic incentives to reduce air emissions. 5 Trading results in
significant savings to industry because it allows firms either to
pollute and pay for that right or to reduce emissions and sell
their excess credits.1 ' In essence, each firm has the freedom to
select the most cost-effective option. 7 Congress and the EPA
viewed trading as a more efficient way to control and eventually
reduce the level of pollution than the traditional approach."
10 Id.
" See Chevron, USA, Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837, 847-59
(1984) (describing the history of the EPA 'Bubble Policy'); Robert W. Hahn and Robert N.
Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18
Ecol L Q 1, 15-16 (1991) (same). The EPA also allowed trading of lead credits during its
lead phasedown. Id at 17.
12 EPA, Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General Principles for Creation, Bank-
ing and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed Reg 43814 (1986).
13 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 401, 104 Stat at 2584-631, codified at 42 USC
§§ 7651-51o.
14 Major Vincent Joseph Rafferty, Jr., Uncle Sam Goes to Market: Federal Agency
Disposal of Emissions Reduction Credits under the Federal Property Management Regula-
tions, 146 Milit L Rev 154, 167-68 (1994).
Perry S. Goldschein, Going Mobile: Emissions Trading Gets a Boost from Mobile
Source Emission Reduction Credits, 13 UCLA J Envir L & Pol 225, 230-31 (1994-95).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 51 Fed Rag at 43814 (cited in note 12); Clean Air Act Amendments, S Rap No 101-
228, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 303 (1990), reprinted in 1990 USCCAN 3684.
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Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA sets air quality standards
and the states implement them." Consequently, the EPA's
emission trading policy only delineates a structure for states to
follow in constructing marketable permit systems.20 The EPA
established the emission reduction credit ("ERC") as the unit of
currency in these emissions trading programs.2 ERCs grant to
the holder a right to emit a particular air pollutant.22 A firm can
create ERCs by reducing emissions below the baseline level al-
lowed by its permit for that source.'
Emissions trading encompasses four uses of emissions reduc-
tion credits: in 'bubbles,' as 'offsets,' in 'netting,' and in 'bank-
ing.'2' These alternatives do not alter the aggregate amount of
pollution allowed by the EPA, but give states and utilities more
flexibility in meeting these standards.' A bubble is an
imaginary boundary placed over one or more polluting plants or
other facilities.26 'Bubbles' allow one or a group of existing
plants to increase the level of pollution at one source in exchange
for less pollution at another source.27 In essence, the entire
plant's or facility's emissions, instead of those from an individual
smokestack or pipe, form a single regulatory unit.' 'Offsets' al-
low a firm to construct a new facility or expand an existing one
after securing surplus ERCs from other sources in the area to
compensate for the additional pollution that will result.'
'Netting' allows a firm to modify an existing source in a manner
that increases emissions after reducing emissions at another
point in the same source. 0 Finally, 'banking' allows firms to ac-
cumulate ERCs for future use in bubble, offset, and netting
transactions."' Firms may also sell or transfer banked ERCs to
19 42 USC §§ 7407-10.
20 51 Fed Reg at 43831-32 (cited in note 12).
21 Id.
Id at 43832-33.
" Id at 43832. See also Robert W. Hahn and Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the
Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 Yale J Reg 109, 113-14
(1989).
2' 51 Fed Reg at 43830-31 (cited in note 12). See also Rafferty, 146 Milit L Ray at
156-58 (cited in note 14).
2' 51 Fed Rag at 43814 (cited in note 12).
26 Rafferty, 146 Milit L Rev at 156 (cited in note 14).
27 51 Fed Reg at 43830 (cited in note 12).
n Rafferty, 146 Milit L Rev at 156 (cited in note 14).
2 51 Fed Reg at 43830-31 (cited in note 12).
30 Id at 43830.
31 Id at 43831.
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other firms. 2 Ultimately, however, the states retain discretion
over whether and how to establish their own programs for the
creation, banking, transfer, and use of ERCs3
B. The S02 Trading Program of 1990
In 1990, Congress added Title IV of the CAA to deal with the
damaging effects of acid rain." The two primary causes of acid
rain are sulfur dioxide ("SO2") and nitrogen oxides ("NO 1 ).35 Af-
ter determining that these compounds came primarily from the
burning of fossil fuels by electric utilities, Congress decided to
reduce significantly power plant emissions of SO2 and NO.."
The NO. reduction plan involves traditional command and con-
trol tactics as the Act sets forth mandatory emissions limitations
for each utility. 7 By contrast, the S02 reduction plan calls for
market-based incentives to induce utilities to comply with the
EPA's regulations." Reduction of SO2 is to take place in two
phases, the first starting January 1, 1995 and the second starting
January 1, 2000."
During Phase I, the CAA allocated emissions allowances to
the 110 dirtiest and largest existing utilities ('affected units')'
and recast the allowances as commodities, available for purchase
and sale.4 The initial allocations depended largely on each
utility's level of emissions from 1985 to 1987.42 The number of'
emissions allowances granted corresponds to an annual emissions
level that is 50% of the 1980 level.43 Attaining this objective will
require utilities to reduce their aggregate emissions of SO2 by ten
million tons annually by the year 2000." Congress did not sub-
32 Id.
'3 51 Fed Reg at 43831 (cited in note 12). See also Rafferty, 146 Milit L Rev at 155
(cited in note 14).
s' Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 401, 104 Stat at 2584-634, codified at 42 USC
§§ 7651-51o.
Larry B. Parker, Robert D. Poling and John L. Moore, Clean Air Act Allowance
Trading, 21 Envir L 2021, 2022 (1991).
' Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 401, 104 Stat at 2584-85, codified at 42 USC
§ 7651.
31 Id at 2613-15, codified at 42 USC § 7651f.
38 Id at 2589-92, codified at 42 USC § 7651b.
s' Id at 2592-613, codified at 42 USC §§ 7651c, 7651d. See Quarles and Lewis, New
Clean Air Act at 40-41 (cited in note 7).
' 42 USC § 7651c.
" 42 USC § 7651b.
42 42 USC § 7651c(a).
4 42 USC § 7651.
4 Id.
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ject unaffected and newly erected units to the Phase I allowance
provisions, but did subject them to the Phase II provisions.45
Phase II of the program will affect many more S0 2-emitting
utilities because the definition of 'affected unit' will then expand
to include smaller utilities." During this phase, the number of
allowances allocated will correspond to total annual emissions of
8.9 million tons of SO.
47
The EPA delegated the administration of annual auctions of
these SO2 allowances to the Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT")."
The supply of allowances comes from utilities with excess credits
and from the CBOT itself.4 The CBOT retains 2.8 percent of the
total allowances allocated each year to ensure that utilities can-
not monopolize the market and that parties who received no
initial allocations can obtain them at a later date.' To date, SO2
trading on the CBOT is the only national public exchange for
pollution credits.5
The EPA and CBOT conducted the first annual auction of
S02 emission allowances in 1993.2 The auction used sealed bids
and sold both spot credits and advance allowances." The first
auction was not very active: "[P]rices were generally low, the
offer/asking differential was substantial and relatively few utili-
ties participated."'
The March 1996 auction indicated market growth over the
first three annual events. The CBOT auctioned 275,000 allowanc-
es, compared to 175,000 in 1995." In 1996, the average success-
42 USC §§ 7651c, 7651d.
42 USC § 7651d.
42 USC § 7651b(aXl).
Deborah M. Mostaghel, State Reactions to the Trading of Emissions Allowances
under Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 22 BC Envir Aff L Rev 201, 202
(1995). The CBOT sells the auctioned allowances on the basis of price, starting with the
highest-priced bid. 42 USC § 7651o(dX2).
, The EPA may not set a minimum price for the allowances withheld under
§ 7651o(b), but other sellers may specify a minimum sale price. 42 USC §§ 7651o(dX2),
(4).
,5 42 USC § 7651o(b). For example, affected units in Phase I of the program that
wish to expand their facilities will require additional allowances for the excess emissions
generated by the expansion. The proceeds from sales of the withheld shares go to the
individual utilities from whom they were initially withheld. 42 USC § 765lo(dX3).
' Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 Stan Envir L J 300, 303
(1995).
5 Adam J. Rosenberg, Emissions Credit Futures Contracts on the Chicago Board of
Trade: Regional and Rational Challenges to the Right to Pollute, 13 Va Envir L J 501, 513
(1994).
83 Id.
" Id at 516.
55 Thomas Brotzman, Opening the Floor to Emissions Trading, Chemical Marketing
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ful bid price for an allowance was approximately $68 per ton,
down from $132 per ton in 1995, and significantly less than the
statutory price of $1,500 per ton." The number of bidders par-
ticipating in the auction increased from 150 in 1995 to 263 in
1996. 67
Given the 1996 average bid price, achieving compliance by
purchasing credits in the open market costs dramatically less
than non-compliance, assuming full enforcement. The EPA fine
for excess emissions of SO2 is $2,000 per ton." Additionally, an
excess polluter must offset its current year's excess emissions in
the following year by a corresponding reduction in amount of
tonnage produced.59
Many auction participants agree that when most of the in.-
dustry becomes subject to regulation during Phase II and firms
have determined the extent of start-up costs,' ° the market will
develop and mature effectively."1 This development is expected
to result partly from increased price predictability and lower
transaction costs. However, ERC trading will be cost-effective for
firms only if they face differing marginal compliance costs. 2 If
they do, then the program will allow the utilities with lower
marginal costs to reduce their own emissions and sell their ex-
Reporter SR8 (May 27, 1996).
Id; 42 USC § 7651o(c). The CBOT charges the statutory price for an allotment of
25,000-50,000 allowances from the 2.8% it withholds each year. The $1,500 per ton sales
price applies only to these particular allowances, which it sells on a first-come basis. 42
USC § 7651o(c). Notwithstanding the statutory price, sales of privately-owned allowances
can be sold at any price.
57 Casey Bukro, Cleaner Air at Lower Cost, Chi Trib 3-1, 3-3 (Mar 26, 1996). The
number of bidders exceeds the number of Phase I-regulated utilities because law schools,
environmental groups, and other interested parties have bought and retired some credits
to further limit the amount of SO, pollution. Brian Doherty, Selling Air Pollution, Reason
32, 35 (May 1996). Also, some Phase II-utilities are buying allowances and now banking
them for use during Phase II. Bukro, Cleaner Air at Lower Cost, Chi Trib at 3-3 (cited in
note 57).
' 42 USC § 7651j(a).
59 42 USC § 7651j(b).
6' In order to lower emissions levels, utilities must either switch from high-sulfur to
low-sulfur coal or install new technology, which is very expensive. With the former,
utilities will realize cost-savings in the current year, but with the latter, the actual cost-
savings will take place after the initial installation year. The evidence shows that many
utilities have chosen to take the former route instead of making large capital expendi-
tures because of uncertainty created by the pending deregulation of the electrical producer
market. See SO, Allowances' Sharp Price Decline Attributed Mainly to Low-Sulfur Coat,
34 Air/Water Pollution Report's Envir Week 45, 45-46 (Jan 22, 1996).
Rosenberg, 13 Va Envir L J at 517 (cited in note 52).
Comment, Assessing Point Source Discharge Permit Trading: Case Study in Con-
trolling Selenium Discharges to the San Francisco Bay Estuary, 21 Ecol L Q 79, 82 (1994).
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cess allowances to utilities with higher marginal compliance
costs. As long as purchasing a credit on the open market costs
less than reducing actual emissions, a ready market for excess
credits will exist. Of course, this scenario assumes moderate
transactions costs and the accurate tracking of permits and emis-
sions levels.'
Several theories may help to explain why prices for SO,
credits have been depressed since their introduction in 1990.
First, the evidence shows that utilities have reduced emissions
far past the Phase I targets." Therefore, the supply of credits in
the marketplace has greatly exceeded the demand. One critic has
also suggested inadequacies in the bidding process and unwanted
media scrutiny when utilities do engage in public trading contrib-
ute to low prices."5
Perhaps one of the reasons that trading has not flourished as
much as the EPA and Congress expected is that ERCs are not
private property. In its 1990 amendments to the CAA, Congress
specified that allowances to emit SO, do not constitute a property
right and retained the right to terminate or withdraw them at
anytime." This characteristic may make firms wary of paying
money for an uncertain future. Firms might'hesitate to pollute
during the year when uncertainty exists about whether they
could purchase other firms' excess credits at the end of the year.
Taking a more cautious route, many utilities have chosen to
reduce emissions independently."7 This hesitation may be a re-
sult of the uncertainty over the private property aspect of ERCs.
II. BANKRUPTCY LAw
A. Potentially Relevant Bankruptcy Code Provisions
Congress's decision not to give ERCs private property status
also creates uncertainty about their treatment during bankrupt-
cy. Generally, a bankruptcy estate includes all of the assets of
the debtor, but Congress's characterization of ERCs might create
an exception to this rule.
Determining whether to include ERCs in a bankruptcy estate
and how to value them affects two situations. First, it determines
6 Id.
6 34 Air/Water Pollution Report's Envir Week at 45 (cited in note 60).
Doherty, Selling Air Pollution, Reason at 36-37 (cited in note 57).
42 USC § 7651b(f). See also Doherty, Selling Air Pollution, Reason at 36 (cited in
note 57).
67 Doherty, Selling Air Pollution, Reason at 35-36 (cited in note 57).
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the availability of assets to satisfy the claims of creditors of a
bankruptcy estate. Second, it affects the powers available to the
trustee in voiding certain transfers and liens on the property of'
the debtor.
1. 'Property' of the bankruptcy estate.
Bankruptcy protection should ensure an orderly liquidation
process in the case of complete dissolution, or allow the debtor to
reorganize its operations with some breathing space from its
creditors."
Immediately after a debtor 'voluntarily' or its creditors
'involuntarily' file a petition for bankruptcy,69 the Code creates
an estate that includes "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property ... .7o This provision generally includes all
assets of the debtor in the estate. For example, courts have held
that causes of action,71 an FCC radio station operating li-
cense,72 an elevator maintenance contract,73 and a motor carri-
er license 74 were property of an estate.
A restriction or condition on the transfer of a debtor's inter-
est ordinarily will not exempt it from classification as property of
the estate.75 For example, the holder of an FCC broadcast li-
cense must receive approval from the FCC before transferring it
to another party.7 Nevertheless, at least one court has held that
an FCC license is property of the bankruptcy estate.77 Nor will
the mere fact that an interest is government-created preclude the
interest from classification as a property right.7"
Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Cases, Problems, and Materials on
Bankruptcy 1-2, 37 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1990).
' Voluntary and involuntary petitions are classified as such from the perspective of
the debtor. 11 USC §§ 301-303.
0 11 USC § 541(a).
71 Sierra Switchboard Co. v Westinghouse Electric Corp., 789 F2d 705, 707-09 (9th Cir
1986).
71 In re Central Arkansas Broadcasting Co., 68 F3d 213, 214-15 (8th Cir 1995).
" In re Da-Sota Elevator Co., 939 F2d 654, 655-56 (8th Cir 1991).
7' Barutha v Prentice, 189 F2d 29, 29-31 (7th Cir 1951) (holding that even though
Wisconsin statute specifically did not confer property right to licensee, licenses were part
of the bankruptcy estate because they were transferable and had considerable value).
7' 11 USC § 541(cXl). Restrictions on transfer of beneficial interest in a trust are also
exempt. 11 USC § 541(c)(2).
"' Communications Act, 47 USC § 301 (1994).
77 Central Arkansas Broadcasting, 68 F3d at 214-15 ("Although federal regulations do
not allow the debtor to own the broadcasting license, it still has considerable value to the
debtor because the license can be transferred to a third party, subject to the FCC's ap-
proval.").
78 In the Matter of American Central Airlines, Inc., 52 Bankr 567, 570-71 (Bankr N D
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In In re Da-Sota Elevator Co.," the court held that an ele-
vator maintenance contract was property of the bankruptcy es-
tate.80 The court based its decision on several factors, including
the fact that the elevator maintenance contract had commercial
value to the debtor and that it created "rights sufficiently similar
to property rights to be treated as assets of a bankrupt estate."
'1
The court relied principally on In re Nejberger2 for the latter
consideration.'
Nejberger involved an expired liquor license which the court
held to have value, despite its lapse, because reinstatement of
the license was possible with a renewed application." Looking
to state law 5 to determine if a property right existed, the court
held that "an expectation of consideration for renewal... quali-
fies as a property interest within the meaning of the Bankruptcy
Act."8M
2. Effect of insolvency on the trustee's powers.
Insolvency is not a prerequisite to obtaining relief under the
Bankruptcy Code's provisions. In both voluntary and involuntary
petitions for bankruptcy, the debtor must simply be unable to
meet its debts as they become due. 7 Instead, the issue of insol-
vency arises most often today in the context of the trustee's abili-
ty to avoid preferential transfers,"8 avoid fraudulent transfers
and obligations, 89 and set aside liens on the debtor's property."
The Code creates a rebuttable presumption of insolvency
during the ninety days preceding the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.9' The voidable preference provisions of the Code work
Iowa 1985) (holding that a possessory interest in an airport landing slot constituted
property of the estate).
939 F2d 654.
o Id at 655-56.
81 Id.
82 934 F2d 1300 (3d Cir 1991).
939 F2d at 656.
934 F2d at 1301-03.
Id at 1302. Although state law was not dispositive, the court found that it helped
define 'property' of the estate, and that the ultimate classification was a matter of statu-
tory interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code. Id at 1302, citing Butner v United States, 440
US 48 (1979).
" Id at 1303.
87 11 USC §§ 301, 303(h). See, for example, In re Kjellsen, 155 Bankr 1013, 1023
'Bankr D SD 1993).
8 11 USC § 547(bX3).
11 USC § 548(aX2XBXi).
'o 11 USC § 545(1XD).
9' 11 USC § 547(f). See also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, S Rep No 95-989, 95th
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to ensure equality of distribution among all creditors and to deter
creditors from racing to the courthouse to 'dismember' a debtor
during its slide into bankruptcy.92 The court determines insol-
vency as of the time of the transaction in question, but may also
use subsequent information."
The trustee may essentially reverse preferential transfers
made by the insolvent debtor if they enabled a creditor to receive
more than it would have had it participated in the distribution of'
the assets of the bankruptcy estate.94 The trustee may also void
fraudulent transfers or obligations incurred on or within one year
before the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition for which
the debtor received less than "reasonably equivalent value" in
exchange." Finally, the trustee of a bankruptcy estate may void
some liens on property of the estate that attempt to circumvent
federal priorities." These liens include those that first become
effective against the debtor when the debtor becomes insol-
vent.97
3. Methods of valuation.
The statutory definition of insolvency, which courts have
dubbed the 'balance sheet test, 8 is a "financial condition such
that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all such
entity's property, at fair valuation."99 The statute does not de-
fine fair valuation of the bankruptcy estate, but courts have held
that it should equitably reflect fair market price, such that "[i]t
involves a value that can be made available for payment of debts
within a reasonable period of time.""® It is generally associated
with the 'going concern' or 'fair market' value and might or might
not be equivalent to the values assigned on the balance sheet
prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Prin-
ciples ("GAAP").1°' These values might not be equivalent be-
Cong, 2d Sess 89 (1978), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5875 (stating that the presumption
is rebuttable).
" Bankruptcy Law Revision, HR Rep No 95-595, 95th Cong, 2d Sess, 177-78 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 6138; Union Bank v Wolas, 502 US 151, 161-62 (1991).
" In re Mama D'Angelo, Inc., 55 F3d 552, 556 (10th Cir 1995).
11 USC § 547(b); HR Rep No 95-595 at 177, reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 6138
(cited in note 93).
11 USC § 548(a). See BFP v Resolution Trust Corp., 511 US 531, 535-36 (1994).
11 USC § 545.
11 USC § 545(1XD).
" See, for example, In re R.M.L., Inc., 92 F3d 139, 154-55 (3d Cir 1996).
11 USC § 101(32XA). The definitions applicable to partnerships and municipalitiesi
differ slightly from the general definition. 11 USC § 101(32XB), (C).
100 Syracuse Engineering Co. v Haight, 110 F2d 468, 471 (2d Cir 1940).
1o' See In the Matter of Lamar Haddox Contractor, Inc., 40 F3d 118, 121 (5th Ci"
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cause a GAAP balance sheet generally includes assets and liabili-
ties valued on a historical basis.1 2 Fair value contemplates a
willing seller and a willing buyer." It estimates "what the
debtor's assets would realize if sold in a prudent manner in cur-
rent market conditions,"'04 ideally accounting for events that
might affect ultimate realization." 5
Besides going concern or fair market value and GAAP, two
other methods exist to value the assets of a bankruptcy estate.
'Liquidation value' is appropriate if the debtor is "so close to
shutting its doors that a going concern standard is unrealis-
tic.""° A going concern is not necessarily a thriving business,
but must be able to maintain some semblance of normal opera-
tions and have a reasonable ability to continue. 10 7 "Before the
going concern valuation is to be abandoned the business must be
wholly 'inoperative, defunct or dead on its feet'. ' s Alternative-
ly, valuation may reflect the sale price at a 'fire-sale' auction."°
As the name suggests, such a sale is one in which the immediate
goal is to rid the estate of its assets at any price. The focus is on
speed, rather than price.
B. The Treatment of ERCs in Bankruptcy"0
No court appears to have addressed the issue of whether SO2
reduction credits should be treated as assets in bankruptcy.
Moreover, discussion among critics and academics is also lacking,
probably because the credits are a relatively new phenomenon.
1994). But see In re Craftmart, Inc., 1994 WL 118274, *4 (N D Cal 1994).
,o In the Matter of Taxman Clothing Co., Inc., 905 F2d 166, 169-70 (7th Cir 1990).
103 Syracuse Engineering, 110 F2d at 471.
104 Lamar Haddox Contractor, 40 F3d at 121, quoting Pembroke Development Corp v
Commonwealth Savings & Loan Assn, 124 Bankr 398, 401 (Bankr S D Fla 1991).
"o R.M.L., 92 F3d at 156.
"' Mama D'Angelo, 55 F3d at 555-56, quoting In re Vandais Lumber Supply, Inc., 100
Bankr 127, 131 (Bankr D Mass 1989).
107 Id at 556; Craftmart, 1994 WL 118274 at *4.
1- In re Art Shirt Ltd., Inc., 93 Bankr 333, 341 (Bankr E D Pa 1988), quoting In re
Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 56 Bankr 339, 387 (Bankr D Minn 1985).
' See Vanlecuwen v Farm Credit Administration, 600 F Supp 1173, 1177, 1180 (D Or
1984). See also In re EBP, Inc., 172 Bankr 241, 247 (Bankr N D Ohio 1994).
110 This Comment focuses on the federal SO, trading program for the sake of
simplicity, but the reasoning extends to other emissions trading programs. This analysis
is an adequate paradigm because the SO2 program followed the general guidelines
established by the EPA for all ERC trading, making it essentially a subset of the broader
ERC trading program. In extending the reasoning, the valuation of the ERCs poses the
only potential obstacle. Almost all ERC trades, other than SO, trades, are privately
negotiated, leaving no public record of purchase price.
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The CAA gives some guidance as to the implications of filing
for bankruptcy on the ERC allocations. "[T]he removal of an
existing affected unit or source from commercial operation at any
time after November 15, 1990... shall not terminate or other-
wise affect the allocation of allowances pursuant to section 7651c
[Phase I allocations] or 7651d [Phase II allocations] of [Title 42]
to which the unit is entitled."' In other words, a change in the
operation of any plant will not alter the amount of annual SO2
emissions allowances it receives from the EPA.12 The EPA
would not return the credits to the general pool for reallocation
to other utilities.
While the statute specifically addresses the consequences of
a change in affected unit or source operations on ERC allocations,
it is silent regarding the dissolution of an entire utility. Even so,
the prediction that a utility will continue to receive its allocations
while still a going concern would not conflict with the provision
for individual affected units. In fact, the dissolution of an entire
utility represents an aggregation of many changes in individual
units. Presumably, however, if a utility then became completely
inoperative, the total allocation in the remaining years of the
program would decrease. This scenario, while somewhat specula-
tive, is consistent with the CAA's broad goal of reducing the
amount of air pollutants. This reading of the CAA suggests that
ERCs are property, but only to the extent that an entity still
exists to receive them.
III. PROPOSED TREATMENT OF ERCs
Although courts have yet to address the treatment of ERCs
in bankruptcy, courts should include them as assets of a bank-
ruptcy estate because they are similar to other permits and i-
censes that have been classified as assets. Moreover, this treat-
ment would further the goals of the Bankruptcy Code. Further-
more, to achieve consistency with the Code, courts should use the
fair market valuation method.
.. 42 USC § 7651b(a).
,,2 See Larry B. Parker, Robert D. Poling and John L. Moore, Clean Air Act Allowance
Trading, 21 Envir L 2021, 2029 (1991) ("For example, a utility may choose to shut down
an existing power plant and use those allowances to offset emissions from two newer,
cleaner facilities.").
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A. Proposed Treatment is Consistent with Case Law and Goals
of the Bankruptcy Code
Because courts have construed the definition of 'property' of
the bankruptcy estate broadly,1 ' the inclusion of SO2 credits in
the estate would be true to precedent. By including as many
assets of the debtor in the estate as possible, the bankruptcy
estate can simulate a going concern debtor dealing with its credi-
tors. Also, because the estate is theoretically the 'remainder' of
the debtor's operations, it should reasonably include all that the
creditors helped to 'create' by extending credit to the debtor.
ERCs exhibit the relevant traits found in other assets that
the courts have classified as property of the estate. As with FCC
broadcast licenses, the state grants ERCs, conferring some right
upon the holder."4 In the case of FCC licenses, the holder is en-
titled to broadcast radio waves on a particular band of the radio.
An ERC entitles the holder to emit one ton of SO2. However, the
government does not allow the holder of either to 'own' the rights
in the sense of retaining an absolute property right to them. FCC
licenses are subject to redemption or seizure of the credits and
Congress may withdraw or limit ERCs at any time."5 Never-
theless, courts have held that FCC licenses are property of the
estate."' By analogy, ERCs should also qualify as such.
At least one court, in contemplating an elevator maintenance
contract, has answered the property question based on whether
the asset has commercial value."' Under this rule, courts
should classify ERCs as property because the credits have an
ascertainable commercial value. A filing for bankruptcy does not
affect the initial allocations set forth in Title IV of the CAA."8
Therefore, the excess credits will still exist for a bankrupt utility
or its trustee to sell for cash each year.
Likewise, courts have held both liquor licenses"9 and motor
carrier licenses"2 to be assets in a bankruptcy estate. Pollution
credits are similar to these licenses because all are creatures of
regulation and explicitly do not confer an absolute property right
on the holder. The government may revoke or modify them at
..3 See Part II.A.1.
Compare 47 USC § 301 (FCC) with 42 USC § 7651b (CAA).
Compare 47 USC §§ 501-04 (FCC) with 42 USC § 7651b(f) (CAA).
, In re Central Arkansas Broadcasting Co., 68 F3d 213, 214-15 (8th Cir 1995).
.. In re Da-Sota Elevator Co., 939 F2d 654, 656 (8th Cir 1991).
118 See Part II.B.
"' In re Nejberger, 934 F2d 1300, 1301-03 (3d Cir 1991).
'20 Barutha v Prentice, 189 F2d 29, 31 (7th Cir 1951).
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any time. Therefore, the classification of liquor and motor carrier
licenses as assets of the estate should compel a similar classifica-
tion of SO, credits.
The ultimate goal of the CAA is to reduce pollution. At first
glance, excluding SO, credits from the bankruptcy estate would
seem to further that goal. However, excluding the credits would
not reduce the aggregate level of allowable emissions.'' In-
stead, exclusion would simply result in fewer available assets to
satisfy creditors' claims.
The assets available to settle creditors' demands determine
ex ante the extent to which they are willing to contract with a
debtor and under what terms. During the normal course of busi-
ness, the debtor enters into business arrangements with many
parties, including suppliers, customers, and employees. These
parties are interested in the financial stability of the debtor and
the assets that will be available to the trustee to satisfy the
claims in case of bankruptcy. If ERCs were available to the trust-
ee to satisfy claims on the estate, then creditors would generally
be more secure. In turn, they might agree to more lenient cove-
nants, less security, or more favorable credit terms. These condi-
tions would allow the debtor ex ante to engage in more business
transactions, helping to increase economic growth.
A rule of inclusion would make parties more willing to deal
with a debtor sliding into bankruptcy. Including SO, credits in
the bankruptcy estate would increase the assets available under
the 'balance sheet' test, thereby delaying statutory insolvency.
This delay of insolvency might reduce the number of liens, prefer-
ence payments, and fraudulent transfers which trustees could
avoid, making creditors less wary about engaging in transactions
with the debtor.
In general, creditors would be more likely to deal with the
debtor ex ante and would receive more money on the dollar in
bankruptcy ex post if SO, credits were included as assets of a
bankruptcy estate. During times of distress, the inclusion of
ERCs in the estate would result in a bigger pot for all creditors.
On the other hand, one can argue that it is irrelevant wheth-
er SO, credits are included as assets in the estate because once a
legal rule is established, debtors and creditors will structure
their behavior accordingly.'22 Initial allocation does not matter
12 See Part II.B.
See generally Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law, § 1.1 at 8 (Little,
Brown 4th ed 1992).
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to contracting parties because they can negotiate around any cer-
tain rule."2 Nevertheless, the legal rule should be one that
makes all parties better off than they would be under an alterna-
tive legal regime, while remaining consistent with the Code and
the CAA. In the case of inclusion, creditors may expend less in
monitoring costs because of a more credit-worthy debtor and the
debtor may receive better credit terms and pledge less security.
In addition, a rule of inclusion is more consistent with the broad
reach of the Code's definition of property of the estate'2 and
may induce all parties to rely more heavily on the use of ERCs.
B. Courts Should Use Fair Market Value to Value ERCs in
Bankruptcy.
Courts have used fair market value to value other similar
permits and licenses125 and the Code contemplates this methodol-
ogy." Also, fair market value theoretically matches the amount
ultimately realized upon sale of the credits. This amount is im-
portant because it conditions the trustee's avoidance powers on
the estimated net worth of the estate after complete liquidation.
The powers that the Code confers upon the trustee relating to
transactions that occurred at the point in time of insolvency are
powerful and must be limited to what Congress intended. The
definition of insolvency specifies that the estimation process be at
"fair valuation."
127
GAAP valuations, generally the lower of acquisition cost or
market value, while relevant, do not control insolvency determi-
nations: "Requiring application of GAAP would make accountants
and the board which promulgate GAAP the arbiters of insolvency
questions.""2 Acquisition cost might understate the value of the
credits if acquired as part of an initial allocation under Title IV,
because these allocations cost nothing to the recipient.Y On
the other hand, the GAAP valuation might equal the current fair
market value if purchased in the open market, depending on
when the transaction occurred. Because GAAP might understate
or overstate the value of the credits, fair market value is a more
123 Id.
24 11 USC § 541 (1994).
' See, for example, Syracuse Engineering Co. v Haight, 110 F2d 468, 471 (2d Cir
1940).
'2 See text accompanying notes 98-105.
'2' 11 USC § 101(32) (1994).
12 In re Sierra Steel, Inc, 96 Bankr 275, 278 (BAP 9th Cir 1989).
" 42 USC § 7651b(aX1) (1994).
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accurate and consistent method for assessing the value of the
credits.
Compared to fair market value, valuation at both liquidation
value and at 'fire sale' prices will tend to decrease the appraisal
value of assets. The former contemplates the demise of the enti-
ty, which will necessarily incorporate a discount,30 while the
latter contemplates a hurried disposal of assets."1 In contrast,
sales by the trustee in bankruptcy contemplate a more tempered
approach, with negotiations between buyer and seller in an at-
tempt to maximize net proceeds for the estate."3 2 Also, the
trustee will continue to operate the business as usual until the
net proceeds from sale may be maximized."s As such, both liq-
uidation and fire sale valuations would tend to undervalue SO2
credits. This too conflicts with the structure of the Bankruptcy
Code.
CONCLUSION
Even though to date the courts and legal commentators have
not addressed the issue of ERCs in a bankruptcy context, this
relationship will inevitably become more important in the future.
When that time comes, courts should consider the already estab-
lished treatment of similar rights, such as broadcast and liquor
licenses, in determining their treatment and valuation of such
credits. By analogy to these other licenses, ERCs should also
qualify as assets of the bankruptcy estate. Furthermore, courts
should value ERCs at fair market value because this methodolo-
gy is consistent with the purposes behind the Bankruptcy Code
and the valuations of other licenses.
's See In re Craftmart, Inc., 1994 WL 118274, *2 (N D Cal 1994).
131 See Vanlecuwen v Farm Credit Administration, 600 F Supp 1173, 1177, 1180 (D Or
1984).
12 See Syracuse Engineering, 110 F2d at 471.
133 11 USC §§ 721, 1106(aXl) (1994).
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